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Abstract
This study considers the pervasive tax evasion of transition economies, with particular
reference to Russia’s tax system. Starting with a survey of theoretical literature on tax
evasion and corruption, it argues that, although standard tax theory offers many
insights, certain special features of transition economies deserve attention. These
include the legacy of socialism resulting in a state willing to exercise discretionary
power but possibly lacking credibility and public support, the ‘disorganisation’
phenomenon that hampers efficient tax administration, and the relationship of
restructuring, speed of reform and the tax system. The paper also contains
recommendations on reform of the tax system to achieve reasonable deterrence of
evasion.
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1  Introduction
During the early years of transition, there was a strong fear that tax evasion
and corruption would become severe problems in post-communist economies
[see e.g. Tanzi (1993)]. Unfortunately, this is precisely what happened in
many countries. In a recent study, Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997)
present evidence that in 1995 the shadow economies in countries of the Former
Soviet Union amounted on average to 34 % of the economy, and 19 % in
Central and Eastern Europe. Figures are no more encouraging when it comes
to corruption. An EBRD survey (1997) on the extent of corruption among
public official gave highest corruption scores for transitional countries among
all country grouping.1 All the Former Soviet Union countries of the study
received high scores. The scores for Russia are also in line with those of
Transparency International.
Mainstream economics sees corruption as harmful for growth [Bardhan
(1997), Tanzi (1998)]. Likewise, it is straightforward to argue that tax evasion
has very much the same effects as corruption. By definition, tax evasion
hampers tax collection and undermines fiscal policy. This, in turn, detracts
from state efforts to implement sound economic development [Burgess and
Stern (1993), Budina and van Wijnbergen (1997)]. The Russian government’s
current problems in tax collection speak volumes in this respect. The IMF, the
OECD and many independent observers repeatedly stress that the Russian
tax system is complex, unfair and incapable of raising enough revenue to
meet its needs. This has lead to the situation where tax evasion is pervasive
on the one hand, and the path of government debt unsustainable, on the other.
Perhaps establishing a good tax system in a transition economy is difficult, but
it is nevertheless necessary.
In the following, we survey the theoretical literature on tax evasion and
assess it from a viewpoint of an economy in transition. The paper also con-
tains recommendations for possible reforms of the tax system that achieve
reasonable deterrence of evasion. The extensive body of tax theory litera-
ture, well presented in e.g. Cowell (1990) and Myles (1995), helps identify
the issues important for transitional countries. The role of social norms, atti-
tudes towards the state and inequality are all factors that explain some of the
evasion behaviour in transition economies. With deference to some recent
insightful papers on optimal taxation under tax evasion, the paper argues the7
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need to fight evasion is likely to be most acute in transition economies. Poor
tax administration further complicates the task, as the administrators prob-
ably do not wield many of the most powerful tools suggested by tax theory.
Therefore, a trade-off between efficiency and administrative shortcomings is
a most important concern in policy analysis in these countries. Another area
that deserves special attention is the need for a fair and credible tax system
that guarantees public support for government action. Here, the perceived
effectiveness of public policy and honesty of government officials are impor-
tant. Although the word ‘corruption’ does not appear in the title of this study,
we subscribe to the view that tax evasion and corruption are closely related.
Fighting corruption may in fact be one of the most important measures in
reducing tax evasion in transition countries. The circumstances in transition
countries often coincide with factors that according to theory promote the
threat of corruption. We relate discussion on the lessons from tax theory with
observations of Russia and its tax system.
We also consider the proper role of tax theory in transition countries.
We ask whether tax recommendations based on Western experience and,
possibly, standard tax theory developed for industrial countries, are directly
applicable to transition economies. Indeed, is there a need for a theory of
transition taxation? Newbery and Stern (1988) and Burgess and Stern (1993)
discuss such issues in the context of tax reform in developing countries. They
broadly conclude that the overall aims in taxation (efficiency, equity) remain
the same across countries, and even shorter-term objectives, such as foster-
ing growth by tax incentives, may be deduced from the uniform long-term
aims. As opposed to industrial countries, the crucial differences in tax analy-
sis in developing countries are in the constraints on government, e.g. adminis-
trative and informational restrictions. Eventually however, Burgess and Stern
argue, the tax system should proceed towards the style now prevalent in
developed countries.
The present paper takes the view by Burgess and Stern as its starting
point for the case of transitional countries as well and discusses in some detail
the importance of tax administration as a constraint for tax design. Blanchard
and Kremer (1997) observe that economic behaviour under transitional peri-
ods is characterised by ‘disorganisation’. The same phenomenon is distinctly
present in the public sector in transition countries. Transition requires a thor-
ough re-orientation in the way the government functions. This paper describes
some of its implications on tax administration and suggests that disorganisa-8
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tion within the public sector might be more difficult to tackle than in the pri-
vate sector due to incentive problems.
We further argue there may be features of taxation in transition coun-
tries that amount to more than just constraints. One feature is the mixed role
of the state inherited from the socialist era. While transition implicitly requires
the separation of many economic activities from state control, many traces of
an interventionist state attitude towards the economy persist (especially in
countries of the former Soviet Union).2 Meanwhile, the credibility and public
support of the government may be very low. Both phenomena tend to in-
crease the willingness to evade taxes and to rely on shadow economy activi-
ties. Thus, taxation in transition countries may be based on principles other
than welfare maximisation. Like corruption, credibility and fairness deserve
special attention in transition countries. The paper discusses instances where
an ‘ultra-fair’ tax reform can reduce traditional efficiency of taxation, thereby
complicating tax design in transitional countries. Simple and fair taxation might
be necessary, but it is also costly.
A possibly more interesting interaction between transition and taxation
is the role of tax instruments in influencing the restructuring of an economy.
Subsidies from state to firms are often associated with the problem of soft
budget constraint, but as Schaffer (1995) argues, imposing only low level of
taxation or tolerating tax arrears and evasion may behave in a same way.
This paper sets up a simple example to illustrate how a preference for a slow
speed of reform leads to a tax system that allows (to some extent) loss-
making firms to operate by enforcing only low levels of taxation and lax tax
collection. Similarly, the entire tax systems of transition countries are depend-
ent on the path of restructuring. This refers to the relative shares of various
tax forms in total tax collection. These tentative conclusions seem to be con-
sistent with the experiences of Central and Eastern European Countries
(whereby restructuring is fast and tax systems quite similar to the Western
ones) and from the former Soviet Union (where earlier socialistic style of
taxation is more visible and tax evasion higher).
Tax issues in transitional countries have in general received rather lim-
ited attention in the earlier literature. The articles in the book edited by Tanzi
(1992) provide a good overview of various tax policy issues in these coun-
tries. Some of the arguments are highlighted in Tanzi (1993) as well. As cited
above, he warns about tax evasion problems in these countries and argues
against interventionist policy involving the state squeezing revenues from the9
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firms. He also stresses that simply immediately adopting the Western style of
taxation may lead to severe problems in transition countries, as information
and administrative capabilities are not sufficiently developed. McLure (1992)
concentrates on taxation of firms and suggests that many of the conditions of
transition countries argue for cash-flow based profit taxation.3 Newbery (1997)
applies the tools of standard optimal tax analysis, initiated by Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971), to discuss how optimal linear income and commodity taxes
respond in a transitional period. He analyses a situation where before-tax
wage-income dispersion increases and at the same time inequality aversion in
the society decreases. Lopez–Claros and Alexashenko (1998) discuss at a
general level the changes needed to Russian tax and expenditure policy. None
of the studies mentioned above, however, concentrates specifically on tax
evasion issues. The exceptions are rare. Johnson et al (1997) develop a model
to explain the impact of tax and public spending policies on the size of the
shadow economy in a country. They test the predictions of the model on data
from CEE and CIS countries. Gaddy and Ickes (1998) provide an intriguing
treatment of the reasons for the bifurcation of the Russian economy into
official and unofficial sectors, which emphasises the weaknesses of the present
tax structure. Yakovlev (1998) describes various cases of ‘black money’ tax
evasion by Russian firms. The present paper therefore differs from much of
the literature mentioned above. It draws extensively on the standard optimal
taxation literature and assesses tax evasion in transitional countries in terms
of features that are arguably transition-specific.
The paper proceeds by reviewing first, in section 2, the standard litera-
ture on tax evasion. Section 3 examines the interaction between evasion and
corruption, while those taxation issues that are arguably specific to transi-
tional countries are discussed in section 4. A modelling exercise illustrating
some of the discussion of section 4 is allocated to the appendix. Section 5
provides concluding remarks.
2 Theory on tax evasion and transitional countries
This section offers an overview on the standard approach to tax evasion in
economic theory. Obviously, a short introduction can not do justice to the
issues involved. Our aim here is rather to point out the implications of theory
for current practice in transition countries. For this purpose, we first review10
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how tax evasion has been addressed in the literature. We then proceed to
discuss the role of social norms for evasion behaviour. Finally, we touch upon
optimal taxation in the presence of evasion. In passing, we also discuss some
of the implications of the theory on Russian taxation system. While preparing
this study, Russia’s tax system has been subject to many changes, as almost
all of the old tax laws should be replaced by a new comprehensive tax code.
In addition, it not clear to what extent the government change in autumn 1998
affects the tax reform plan. Our discussion of the Russian case draws on
Popova and Tekoniemi (1998), Lopez–Claros and Alexashenko (1998) and
Economist Intelligence Unit (1998), and therefore remains at a general level.
It should also be noted that a number of conceptual difficulties attach to tax
evasion. One common distinction is tax avoidance, which is legal but some-
times quite similar to evasion. In what follows, this paper abstracts from these
and discusses evasion, loosely speaking, as the illegal concealment of tax
liability.4
2.1 The basic framework
The basic setting describes the tax evasion decision by an individual taxpayer
as a rational choice under uncertainty.5 Taking into account the basic param-
eters of the economy (tax rate, detection probability, fines imposed on the
evader when caught), the taxpayer has to decide how much of his exogenous
income to report to the tax authorities. The decision to evade taxes hence
depends on the maximisation of expected utility with respect to the amount of
reported income; honesty and social norms do not affect this decision in the
basic framework. Comparative statics results show how the extent of eva-
sion (the share of income not reported) reacts to changes in the parameters
of the model. It can be demonstrated that evasion increases with increasing
income and decreases if the penalty rate or the probability to get caught
increase. The influence of a change in the tax rate on evasion is however
ambiguous in general. Intuition would suggest that evasion increases with the
tax rate (as this reduces the relative price of evaded income). In the basic
model, this result only holds under specific assumptions. In an extended frame-
work, whereby the tax payer can also decide the amount of his labour supply
in the official or in the unofficial sector of the economy, increasing tax rate
encourages evasion under milder conditions [see Cowell, (1981)]. This result
has also received some, though not clear-cut, support in the empirical litera-11
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ture attempting to measure how different parameters affect tax evasion (Myles
1995).
Examination of the choice between the detection probability and the
fine imposed on detected tax evaders gives an interesting result. If the gov-
ernment objective is to minimise evasion, and if detection is costly, an optimal
policy could be to impose a huge penalty on evaders, but only make modest
efforts at detection (as efficient detection activities are expensive). There
are several caveats here. The tax authorities likely are not free to choose the
general structure of penalties on evaders. It is much more plausible that any
penalties meted out will have to be in line with those for other crimes [Tanzi
and Shome (1993)]. Extremely high penalties are also inconsistent with many
notions of fairness. If evasion is a general practice among taxpayers, but only
a tiny fraction of evaders are detected, punishing them severely probably
violates horizontal equity. In addition, tax authorities can themselves make
mistakes, or if the tax structure is very complicated, even honest taxpayers
may under-report income because they are not aware of all the fine points of
the tax system. Moreover, it is not even clear that the objective of the govern-
ment should be to minimise evasion. Much of the literature chooses in fact to
use a general type of a utilitarian welfare function that also incorporates tax
evaders’ welfare. In a more sophisticated analysis, the choice between vari-
ous instruments becomes much more complicated, so that all optimally eva-
sion is not eradicated altogether.
The observations above offer some implications for the Russian tax
system. At present, the tax system is very complicated and consists of many
different taxes and exemptions (the new tax system is hoped to help in this
respect). The government has tried to impose better tax compliance by threat-
ening evaders with heavy penalties. In practice, this approach has backfired.
People (and firms) are unwilling to file returns, as they fear that they would
be punished by not fulfilling all the requirements of the tax system. The dis-
cussion above suggests that under these circumstances, tax enforcement should
rely more on increasing the detection rate, as opposed to strict penalties and
high fines. This suggestion is reinforced by the observation (discussed in more
detail below) that the tax system as a whole suffers from low credibility and
perceived unfairness. A need to create a more effective fiscal policy deserv-
ing public support can not be supported by strict and sometimes arbitrary
punishments.12
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2.2 Some extensions
One of the most important extensions to the basic set-up regarding the present
study is the incorporation of social norms and honesty to the evasion decision.
Empirical evidence (reviewed by Cowell 1990) suggests that there are con-
siderable differences among countries and groups of people in evasion be-
haviour. Individuals may be motivated by non-utilitarian virtues, such as hon-
esty, or they make their taxpaying decisions based on their perception of the
fair amount of taxes they need to pay. The perception depends, e.g. on the
inequality of the tax system and the fairness of the expenditure structure of
the government. An obvious puzzle for economic analysis is how to formalise
such behaviour and how to apply it to rational, self-interested economic agents.
Gordon (1989) assumes that honesty appears as a separate argument in indi-
viduals’ utility function reducing the utility obtained from evasion. Such a
setting divides taxpayers into two groups. For some parameter values of the
economy, some taxpayers will opt for evading and others will value honesty
over the benefits of evasion.
An interesting possibility here is that the evasion decision depends on
the behaviour of other agents in the economy. In other words, evasion im-
poses an externality on others. Cowell (1990) describes how three possible
equilibria may arise from such an externality. In circumstances where eva-
sion is very rare, tax evaders can be detected easily and evasion may carry a
considerable social stigma. In another equilibrium, tax evasion can be part of
the culture of the country, separating an individual evader is difficult and not
necessarily sensible. Even the initially honest taxpayers choose to evade taxes.
Somewhere in between, there exists a third equilibrium where the benefits of
evasion and honesty are in balance. Cowell argues that this intermediate equi-
librium is unstable; certain exogenous shocks affecting the overall level of
evasion in the economy tend to shift the economy from corner-solution to
another and cause evasion epidemics. Johnson et al (1997) present a similar
model that interprets a situation with high tax compliance and efficient gov-
ernment as a ‘good’ equilibrium and the situation with a large unofficial sec-
tor, corruption and Mafia enforcers as a ‘bad’ equilibrium.
Both the notions of social norms and evasion epidemics have some
explanatory power in the Russian situation. Public opinion towards the state
has been formed by the repression the communist governments sustained –
even in the new circumstances, the role of the state is in a way not fully13
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legitimised. In the words of Kornai (1990, p. 118–19):
‘People in general consider it a laudable act, rather than something to
be ashamed of, if someone defrauds the state, appropriates its wealth,
or shuns its obligations. Those who refrain from this kind of behaviour
are seen as dupes… Consequently, when we contemplate budget rev-
enues we should be prepared to face the fact that many citizens will try
hard to dodge taxes.’
Modern tax systems in the Western countries rely largely on voluntary com-
pliance of the taxpayer. The behaviour described by Kornai severely threat-
ens the underpinnings of that kind of system. Unfortunately, the phenomenon
seems to fit rather well to some experiences in transition economies. Some
may not feel entirely comfortable with explaining the new, post-reform, situa-
tion with experiences from the past, but it is possible to elaborate this argu-
ment. The willingness to contribute to the exchequer’s chambers can depend
on the benefits the taxpayer obtains from the public policy pursued by the
government. If the government fails to meet the needs of its citizens in pro-
viding basic public goods, such as law and order, education and basic social
security, it is quite understandable that the willingness to support the state will
suffer.6 In such a situation, it is probable that the citizens will rely on private
activities in providing these goods. This argument compares to Johnson et al
(1997), who also provide empirical evidence that such a substitution has actu-
ally taken place in many transition economies, most notably those of the former
Soviet Union.
Another possibility is the role of inequality in explaining tax evasion.
The literature on tax evasion [e.g. Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1997)] usu-
ally suggests that high-income earners are more prone to evasion than low-
income households, as they have more at stake and more resources to spend
on concealment. A vast income dispersion, ceteris paribus, would hence im-
ply a high level of tax evasion as well. On the other hand, if tax evasion
increases with tax rates and the progressivity of the tax system, strong redis-
tribution of income could offset the potential tax evasion benefits of an equal
income distribution. One possibility is that large income inequality reduces the
perceived fairness of the tax system among low-income households, thereby
increasing their willingness for fraud in taxpaying. Casual evidence from Russia
(where income inequality has radically risen during the 1990s) suggests that14
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this is the case. The rich evade taxation easily, which in turn affects the
willingness of other households to pay income taxes. Thus, exploring the in-
teraction between equity and evasion may help in development of policy ad-
vice for transition countries.
Finally, claims of evasion epidemics fit the Russian case rather well.
Because of unsuccessful policy in deterring evasion in the past, the economy
has ended up in a situation where evasion and corruption are stable features
of the economy. The evasion epidemics model predicts that as this kind of
equilibrium tends to persist, and breaking the vicious circle is complicated.
2.3 Evasion and optimal taxation
The discussion above has mainly tried to pinpoint various factors affecting
tax evasion. Public economics usually proceeds beyond this by considering
optimal government tax and expenditure policies. This is the case in the litera-
ture on tax evasion as well. As opposed to the standard second-best tax
analysis, optimal taxation exercises in the presence of evasion are compli-
cated and often permit only tentative guidelines for policy. One set of difficul-
ties arises from the determination of government objectives – under optimal
taxation, this shows up in the choice of social welfare function.7 One obvious
candidate is a utilitarian social welfare function that measures the social wel-
fare as a sum of the welfare of honest taxpayers and of tax evaders. A
further question related to the utilitarian case is whether the government should
use the same detection probabilities as the individual tax payers use. An argu-
ment against using other probabilities relies on the idea that the detection
rates are actually policy variables, not exogenous constraints for the govern-
ment. Others note that under rational expectations of the taxpayers, the gov-
ernment cannot use different detection rates than the taxpayers in its policy
evaluation. As the question of giving appropriate weights to different con-
sumers depends on the detection rate of tax evaders, it therefore remains
open. Even so, it is easy to demonstrate [for details, see Cowell (1990)] that
adopting a utilitarian welfare function advises the government to tolerate eva-
sion up to the point where its benefits (e.g. welfare gain from the black mar-
kets or the role of evasion as a device correcting government failures) just
balance with the marginal valuation of the tax revenue and other losses aris-
ing therefrom. This conclusion contrasts with the approach of making hon-
esty as such a virtue and government objective, which naturally would involve15
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abolishing all evasion in the economy. A third candidate, though not for wel-
fare analysis, is that of a Leviathan government (that maximises tax rev-
enues). It is interesting to note that maximising tax revenues in the presence
of evasion is quite similar to aiming at honesty – tax evasion is in both cases
strongly against government’s goals.
While it is important to bear these caveats in mind, optimal evasion-
augmented tax theory nonetheless provides many valuable insights for policy.
Sandmo (1981) examines optimal linear income taxation when there are two
distinct groups of households; those working (only) in the formal sector and
those working in the informal sector. Sandmo adopts the utilitarian social
welfare function and determines the optimal detection probabilities, fines and
tax rates, given taxpayer behaviour. Specifically, Sandmo’s aim was to ana-
lyse whether the presence of evasion gives rise for lower marginal tax rate
(and lower progressivity) as it would be the case in the absence of evasion. In
contrast with the common belief, his analysis does not support such conjec-
ture. The optimal marginal tax rate might actually increase as a result of
evasion. He notes this is what we should have expected. Given that the shadow
economy is distorted by the presence of positive detection probability and
fines, a higher marginal tax rate in the formal market increases, ceteris pari-
bus, (compensated) labour supply at the shadow economy, and thereby miti-
gates distortions in that sector. This result illustrates the role of formal theory
in this respect: although it cannot provide unambiguous answers, it warns
against misleading impressions and provides a logically consistent basis on
which to discuss policy.
Cremer and Gahvari (1994) extend Sandmo’s work by allowing indi-
viduals to freely choose the amount of labour they will supply either market.
They further examine the possibility that taxpayers can spend resources to
conceal part of the evaded taxes from inspection. The marginal tax rate re-
sults they derive crucially depend on the form of ‘concealment technology’.
While they find stronger theoretical support for the argument that evasion
lowers the optimal marginal tax rate, they show that the opposite may also be
the case. Their explanation for a lower marginal tax rate is rather novel, i.e. if
evasion makes the society poorer in a sense that tax revenues fall, it is plau-
sible that the society’s willingness for redistribution, and thereby for the mar-
ginal tax rate, decrease.
Cremer and Gahvari (1996) explore the implications of tax evasion for
optimal general (possibly non-linear) income taxation. Using the self-selec-16
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tion approach to tax analysis in a two-household framework, they discuss
optimal marginal tax rates and audit strategies, which can be, due to non-
linearity, different among the two groups. Optimal audit policy involves a posi-
tive audit probability for people who claim to be low-income earners, while
high-income reporters are not audited. This may at first seem to be a regres-
sive policy (allowing the rich to do whatever they want). Actually, the aim of
the government here is to prevent rich people from reporting a low level of
income, and this is why audits can be targeted to low-income reporters. An-
other interesting result they derive indicates that low-income earners that are
audited but found innocent should pay a lower marginal tax rate than people
not audited. In other words, honesty should be rewarded. Finally, despite the
extension to evasion, qualitative characteristics of the standard income tax
schedule remain valid. This may be seen as an indirect, though not airtight,
argument against lower marginal tax rates in the presence of evasion.
The papers cited above concentrate on the evasion of income taxes.
This reflects the common opinion of economists that income taxation is more
prone to evasion as indirect taxes. Even if a person cheats in his income
taxes, he must consume commodities and pay the taxes on them. Of course,
this argument hinges on the assumption that firms truthfully declare and pay
taxes. Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau (1994) demonstrate rigorously that
if only income taxation can be evaded, it is welfare-improving to supplement
even non-linear income taxation with uniform indirect taxation. As usually,
uniform indirect taxation is however not optimal in their model in general.
Evidence from transitional countries suggests that concentration only on the
evasion of income taxation may be misleading, as firms tend to cheat (and
leave unpaid) their taxes as well.8 This is especially important for Russia,
where the overall share of personal income tax from total tax revenues is
very low, and most of the tax arrears result from the taxation of firms.
Cremer and Gahvari (1993) analyse tax evasion by firms by examining
optimal commodity tax rules in the presence of indirect tax evasion. They
note that there is a trade-off between tax rates for each industry and the audit
probability. Both positive audit probability and tax rate raise revenues, and as
the government has to collect some given amount of revenues, it has to bal-
ance its policy between the two instruments. Another interesting result is that
the optimal tax rate in the presence of evasion is lower for goods, to which
the distortion from evasion is high – in the sense that the expected tax rate
(that encompassing evasion possibility) is much lower than the nominal tax17
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rate. This suggests that in the presence of evasion, there are actually more
reasons to rely on differentiated indirect taxes than otherwise would be the
case. Note however that this result crucially depends on the ability of the
government to distinguish perfectly among industries. In reality (and espe-
cially in the realm of transition) it is much more plausible that firms also cheat
by misreporting the characteristics of their production, thereby seeking a lower
nominal tax rate for their products. This argument becomes especially impor-
tant where administrative capabilities are low.
Some interesting lessons for tax policy emerge from the theory on op-
timal taxation in the presence of evasion. One is that evasion does not give
strong support for lowering the income tax rates – this is especially valid if the
utilitarian point of view is adopted. Combined to the observation that high
inequality may increase evasion, this suggests that a low of income taxation
with little, if any, progressivity is not necessarily supported by evasion consid-
erations. Of course, maintaining income taxation calls for adequate auditing
policy, and it seems that some of the transitional countries (e.g. Russia) might
benefit from streamlining their tax administration in this respect. To restore
confidence on the tax system, it is of vital interest to proceed towards a
system of voluntary compliance, supported by audits that are partially random
and partially dependent on characteristics of the tax payers. Considering the
overall tax structure in Russia, the present situation with a considerable em-
phasis on indirect taxation (which, as the theory has taught us may also be
evaded) and profit taxation have not worked very well in deterring evasion.
Therefore, it is not clear why a stronger reliance on income taxation, backed
with strong commitment to really implement it through control, would perform
worse in terms of evasion.
We will get to the question of administrative feasibility of various tax
structures below, but here it is important to note that administrative complica-
tions can have broad implications on tax instruments. Tanzi (1993) explores
these in detail and concludes that simplicity and clarity should be the guiding
norms in tax design in transition countries. No doubt, these are important
objectives for any tax system in general, and as evidenced by Russia’s present
inability to employ an overly complicated, discretionary tax system, even more
so for economies in transition. Many of the complications of the tax system of
these transition countries are clearly harmful, such as exemptions that are
there just because of some political influence. Nevertheless, it is also impor-
tant to acknowledge that complications can also be welfare-improving. There-18
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fore, there are also costs involved in an approach aiming at simplicity. Many
of the devices developed in the optimal tax literature to deter evasion imply
diverging from simple policies and hence require adequate tax administration.
If it is not available, or if these devices cannot be implemented because of
lack of clarity, tax system fails to utilise all of its power to promote efficiency
and hamper evasion. The clarity-efficiency trade-off is clearly of vital impor-
tance for transition countries and deserves more attention.9
For various reasons that were also touched upon above, Cowell (1990)
concludes that tax theory in general does not warrant a terribly strong case to
minimise evasion. It seems however that in transitional countries this case is
stronger than in other countries. If evasion is common, it begins to hamper the
development of the economy, the simple need to get things done calls for a
serious approach to improve tax collection. This is further reinforced if the
government is in such a difficult fiscal situation that it has no other choice
than to implement a Leviathan-type approach just to survive. In these circum-
stances, good lessons to deter evasion are certainly valuable. The discussion
in this section may indicate that such lessons could be sought from tax theory
as well.
3 The role of corruption in tax evasion
Corruption, which is commonly defined as abuse of public power for private
benefit (Tanzi 1998),10 is of course a different phenomenon than tax evasion.
In the context of taxation, however, the two notions have some important
interactions. This is because tax authorities may be dishonest as well, as
opposed to the above assumption that only the taxpayers cheat. Allowing for
possible corrupt tax officials influences both the willingness of the taxpayers
to evasion and the role of tax administration in fighting evasion. Because of
this interaction, this section explores some of the general discussion on cor-
ruption and looks at the joint analysis of evasion and corruption.
3.1 General theory on corruption
A minority of economists maintain that corruption may actually be harmless,
or even beneficial. Tanzi (1998) and Bardhan (1997) discuss a number of
those pro-corruption arguments. One, in particular, claims that bribes are like19
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other transfers; they influence distribution, but not the efficiency of the economy.
Another possibility is that corruption eases some of the distortions and rigidities
arising from government failure. In this ‘corruption oils the system’ theory,
corruption is seen as a second-best device to restore efficiency to an economy
suffering from e.g. decisions made by a slow and ineffective bureaucracy.
Closely connected to this is the idea about bribes as ‘speed money’: if some
people have a high time preference, they may obtain faster service within the
public sector (for example, when applying for licences) if they bribe a few
authorities. An important argument, and quite plausible for the case of transi-
tional countries, is the possibility that if the government fails to maintain el-
ementary security and a level playing field, corruption and decentralised rules
and law-enforcement procedures (Mafia enforcement) may be substituted
for a weak government. It would therefore not be clear at the outset whether
a Mafia or a central government would be more effective in providing law
and order in the economy. Johnson et al (1997) find some empirical support
that such a substitution has actually taken place in certain transition countries.
Despite these elaborate arguments, empirical evidence generally ar-
gues that corruption is harmful for growth [see e.g. the recent paper by Gupta,
Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (1998)]. This implies that the more traditional
arguments referring to disadvantages of corruption are justified. One of the
most important detrimental impacts of corruption is its influence on incen-
tives. Corruption encourages rent-seeking, instead of socially beneficial, pro-
ductive behaviour. It has implications for the real economy. This is why the
view that bribes only affect distribution is clearly wrong. Corruption also se-
riously undermines the prospects of the government to pursue its goals, be-
cause imposing necessary controls and inspections, as well as providing law
and order is hindered by a corrupt civil service. Widespread corruption blurs
the role of the government in the economy, as it no longer can efficiently
correct market failures, redistribute income or produce market supporting
institutions. When it comes to ‘speeding up’ bureaucratic processes, Bardhan
(1997) notes that while some people benefit from such a practice, its general
equilibrium impacts are ambiguous. Officials may begin to charge for service
that they should provide for free, even if customers actually get faster serv-
ice. Non-bribers may find the time span of their service lengthened.
In an insightful paper, Bliss (1998) argues that it is not sensible to com-
pare fully efficient corruption to distorted, second-best, behaviour of govern-
ment. Many of the distortions involved in the functions of the public sector20
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are not exogenous. Nothing guarantees therefore that ‘privatising’ some of
the functions of the state by resorting to corruption would produce a more
efficient outcome. In many instances for example, asymmetric information
between the government and agents is an inherent feature of the setting and
would not be resolved under private sector activities. Therefore, corruption,
as a substitute for public sector activities, can normally only be at most sec-
ond best. The impacts of bribes on economic behaviour are often compared
to those of taxation, as both create distortions in second-best circumstances.
Therefore, the correct benchmark for an honest second-best public sector is
a corrupted second-best public sector. However, it is also plausible (and in-
deed supported by the data) that corruption creates a larger dead-weight
burden as taxation. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) explain that corruption is in-
herently more costly as taxation since it requires secrecy and consumes re-
sources. Thus, it would seem that resorting to private activities (such as Ma-
fia enforcement) or using corruption to grease the apparatus of government is
costly and creates larger distortions overall than a honest public sector. A
most important final point to note is the one developed by Bliss (1998). The
mere threat of corruption, according to him, requires that the functions and
policies of the state have to be designed with the controlling of corruption in
mind. An administration designed to deter corruption most likely loses some
of its power to pursue other roles. Because of corruption, the government can
only perform worse than if it were honest.
Tanzi (1998) explores factors that contribute to the extent of corrup-
tion. He emphasises that both factors affecting the demand and supply of
corruption should be taken into account. One of the most important factors
affecting the demand for corruption are the nature of government rules and
regulations. If these are very strict, rigid and complicated in letter and, per-
haps more importantly, are implemented arbitrarily because of authorities’
discretion, economic agents are tempted to resort to corruption. They may
even bribe officials to streamline the implementation of regulations related to
them. The legislation and implementation concerning taxation is often one of
the underlying reasons for corruption. If tax laws are complicated and arbi-
trary, taxpayers need assistance in complying with them. This opens possibili-
ties for dishonest tax authorities to require payments from taxpayers for their
assistance. Lack of transparency, complicated tax exemptions and incen-
tives, frequent contacts between tax auditors and taxpayers, and discretion-
ary power of tax officials all promote the environment for corruption. On the21
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supply side, the quality of administration, public sector wages and the penal-
ties from corruption are essential determinants. Low public sector wages
encourage administrators to corruption for at least two reasons. First, the
authorities may actually need extra income to obtain decent living standards.
Second low wages decrease the costs of a potentially lost position if they are
caught for fraud.11
Tanzi (1994) and Bardhan (1997) discuss the importance of social norms
for the extent of corruption in a country. Based on empirical observation,
Tanzi concludes that corruption is more likely to occur in cultures that rely
largely on connections and relationships in economic activities. In those cir-
cumstances, transactions require a large amount what is called ‘social capi-
tal’. Interestingly, the role of norms here is very similar to their influence on
tax evasion. This raises several nagging questions for economic analysis based
on purely rational individuals. At least some of these questions can be re-
solved by applying the idea of multiple equilibria for corruption.12 Hence, a
corruption equilibrium that is seemingly culture-dependent may also be com-
patible with purely rational behaviour. Tirole (1996) finds that, within an over-
lapping generations model, corruption is path-dependent. He argues that the
persistence of corruption may be explained by bad reputation of past genera-
tions. This would explain why shifting away from corruption equilibrium may
fail if the measures are only applied over the short term.
3.2 Corruption and evasion
Although tax collection is a prominent instance of corruption, tax evasion
literature usually parallels discussions of corruption. Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo
(1998) provide an exception. They analyse optimal non-linear taxation schemes
under very general assumptions involving taxpayers earning different incomes,
but all potentially willing to evade taxes and bribe tax auditors. The corrupt
tax auditors may also extort the taxpayers by overstating their tax liability –
the taxpayers can verify their true income only through costly appeals to the
court. The government in such a setting may employ a set of different objec-
tives, including revenue maximisation, evasion and corruption minimisation,
inequality aversion and a combination of all of them. The paper contains many
interesting findings that may be relevant for tax design in transition countries.
One is that the threat of extortion and the possibility for evasion and corrup-
tion result in a tax system that is less egalitarian than it would be in the ab-22
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sence of these factors. The reasoning is quite intuitive, i.e. the rich have more
incentives for evasion, and the threat of income over-reporting is bigger to the
poor because their income level is low in the first place. In addition, if the
government wishes to implement a progressive, non-linear tax schedule (eva-
sion- and corruption-proof), it must pay commissions to tax auditors for high
income reports. This finding gives rigorous verification for the need to in-
crease the remuneration of tax officials if they are possibly corrupt. How-
ever, it also implies that in optimal tax design, the government faces a novel
trade-off between equity and efficiency. Financing the commission to audi-
tors increases the aggregate tax burden and hence decreases the after-tax
income level of the taxpayers. Establishing a fair tax system with distribu-
tional equity thus involves a cost quite distinct from the usual distortion in
labour supply.
Another issue worth observing is the potential interaction between eq-
uity, corruption and the willingness to evade taxation. The previous section
suggested that unequal income distribution probably promotes evasion be-
cause the rich are more prone to evasion and the inequality might decrease
the support to the tax system among low-income earners. Gupta et al (1998)
find that high levels of corruption are associated with high income inequality
and poverty. Income inequality may increase the corruption level of the soci-
ety as in the case of tax evasion. Perhaps more to the point, Cowell (1990)
notes that corruption reduces honesty in taxpaying because it reduces the
perceived fairness and effectiveness of the public sector among the citizens.
Fighting corruption may thus be a necessary and important step to reducing
tax evasion. This conclusion is probably more powerful for transition econo-
mies, where citizens are often reluctant to support the state.
3.3 Influence on transition economies
Although at this point precise evidence regarding corruption in the tax system
is lacking, there are good reasons to believe that if the government as a whole
is corrupt, tax authorities may be dishonest as well. Therefore, it makes sense
to examine at least what the risk of corruption implies for transition econo-
mies. In their study of the Russian public sector, Lopez–Claros and
Alexashenko (1998) explore the problems of Russian tax system and empha-
sise that its complex nature with numerous possibilities for tax incentives and
exemptions provide a fertile ground for tax avoidance. Such tax benefits are23
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often obtained through consultation with and lobbying of tax authorities in
circumstances that share some properties with corrupt behaviour (although
no bribes would take place). It is important to note that the circumstances
now prevalent in Russia, as documented in Lopez–Claros and Alexashenko
(1998), coincide well with the factors promoting corruption mentioned by Tanzi
(1998). Therefore, policies taken to reduce the regulatory role of tax officials
are certainly welcome with respect to the aim of preventing corruption. Frye
and Shleifer (1996), who examine the attitude among local authorities in Mos-
cow and Warsaw towards the private sector, come to the same conclusion
that administration in Russia tends to impose a high regulatory burden on
enterprises. On the supply side of corruption, the fact that public sector sala-
ries are relatively low in transition countries may lead to larger willingness to
accept bribery among the authorities.
Cultural factors as well as the possibility for multiple equilibria are clearly
relevant for transitional countries. Many observations suggest that Russia in
particular is a country where relations are quite important for economic be-
haviour. Gaddy and Ickes (1998) argue that many firms have opted for devel-
oping their ‘relationship’ capital (e.g. influence on authorities) to survive without
a need for major restructuring. This comes close to the analysis of social
capital, which, according to Tanzi (1994), provides fertile ground for corrup-
tion. It is in addition quite plausible that the Russian system may now be
closer to the decentralised equilibrium of law enforcement than some other
countries. Thus, the multiple equilibrium analysis in Bardhan (1997) and the
persistence issue highlighted by Tirole (1996) may explain some of the diffi-
culties faced by the Russian government when attempting to increase the
efficiency of its public sector. Surely not a negligible factor is the role of
inequality. Casual evidence from Russia suggests that many people regard
the government as corrupt and having failed in creating a fair society. They
rationalise tax evasion as a vote of dissent for government activities. The
point raised by Cowell (1990) that reducing corruption is a key to the reform
of tax system as well is a possibility that must be carefully examined in the
Russian case. The discussion in section 4.2 attempts to direct the analysis
along these lines.
We should also mention the important observation by Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) on the implications of the degree of centralisation in corruption. They
note that Russian-style corruption, with many decentralised corrupt authori-
ties, is actually among the most harmful forms of practice. It does not inter-24
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nalise the influence of requiring bribes by one official on the bribe-obtaining
possibilities of another civil servant. A centralised version of corruption would
be less damaging, but of course, still not as efficient as an honest civil service.
In previous section, we argued that the reasons for hampering tax eva-
sion are likely more powerful in transition countries than in industrialised coun-
tries. Based on the discussion in this section, it seems that although fighting
corruption is well indicated for any countries, it may be even more important
in transition economies. This follows from at least three observations. First, if
evasion is an important concern in these countries, reducing corruption is one
of the most important measures to achieve it. Second, cultural factors imply
that the need to build credibility for the public sector is of high importance in
transition countries. Finally, the style of tax administration and enterprise regu-
lation are still largely based on detailed instructions and discretionary power.
4 Tax theory for transition economies
The sections above were intended to illustrate how standard tax theory might
help in designing tax policy in transitional countries. The question that remains
open from the preceding analysis is whether standard theory is directly appli-
cable for economies in transition. Should one adopt different interpretation, or
even distinct theories for such countries? In this section, we discuss this is-
sue. The starting point in the discussion is the ideas developed by Burgess
and Stern (1993) for tax design in developing counties. Their ideas will then
be complemented by some additional features that seem specific to tax eva-
sion problems in transition countries.
4.1 Administration as a constraint
The survey by Burgess and Stern (1993) provides an excellent representation
of the reconciliation of development and public economics. They argue that
the role of the government is in many respects more pronounced in develop-
ing countries, as opposed to industrial countries (for which most economic
theory is written). Many of the needs of development, such as building institu-
tions and basic infrastructure, providing adequate education and social secu-
rity and alleviating poverty are formidable objectives that require public re-
sources. To obtain these resources, there is no sustainable alternative to taxa-25
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tion. At the same time, Burgess and Stern warn, the instances for govern-
ment failure (e.g. corruption, rent-seeking, distorting policies) are a major
concern for developing countries. The potential gains from government policy
in developing countries seem however so important that the caveats, though
they must be acknowledged, should not be taken as prohibitive for developing
the tax system. Burgess and Stern also emphasise that, as the evidence from
these countries suggests, healthy fiscal policy is a key precondition for suc-
cessful stabilisation and, in the longer term, for economic growth.
Having stated the (relatively firm) position for the need to raise sub-
stantial revenues through taxation, Burgess and Stern discuss how taxation
should be designed and organised. They argue that in general, standard tax
theory is valid for all countries. The long-term objectives in taxation, effi-
ciency and distributive equity, should remain the same, and even shorter-term
objectives, such as fostering growth by tax policies, can be deducted from the
uniform long-term aims. As opposed to industrial countries, the crucial differ-
ence in tax analysis in developing countries is in the constraints facing the
government. These include the lack of reliable data, weak administration,
non-competitive economic structures, strong reliance on some particular parts
of the economy (agriculture, exports of raw materials), severe political con-
straints caused by low living standards and knowledge. Eventually, however,
the tax system should proceed towards the Western style; in passing, stand-
ard theory should be applied with care acknowledging the constraints. A
straightforward application of the Burgess and Stern view is, of course, that
the same applies for transitional economies.
One of the most important constraints hindering efficient tax policy
stressed by Burgess and Stern (1993) is the role of tax administration. Its
importance is substantial in the circumstances of transitional economies as
well. Soviet-style taxation was based extensively on direct extraction of re-
sources from state-owned enterprises. In the terminology of tax theory, direct
payments imposed on state-owned firms represent ‘non-tax’ revenue. For
the tax administration of a post-socialist government, transition essentially
implied shifting from collecting non-tax revenues to raising tax revenues. In
the socialist era, the bulk of revenue was collected from a small number of
enterprises, the beginning of transition required collecting it from a large number
of taxpayers, both from firms and individuals. This created a major challenge
for tax administration in these countries. Although the behavioural effects
(e.g. incidence) of those payments bears close resemblance to taxes, they26
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are different from taxes in terms of revenue collection. This implies that the
mere change of regime triggered evasion.13
In the transition economics literature, state go through a period follow-
ing the collapse of the planning system characterised as ‘disorganisation’.
Blanchard and Kremer (1997) show how disorganisation in production struc-
tures may explain the output loss observed in the transition countries follow-
ing the break-up of socialism. We argue that a similar phenomenon must be
present within the (tax) administration as well. As the tax system has to be
built up from scratch, there is considerable uncertainty concerning the aims
and means of taxation. In a sense, we talk about learning progress within the
tax administration. One crucial difference in the learning process in the public
sector, as opposed to that of in private enterprises, is that its incentive schemes
are not clear-cut. In the market, rapid learning is rewarded in terms of higher
profit, whereas the public sector lacks such incentives. The disorganisation
phase is therefore likely to be more difficult and take much more time within
the public sector than in (efficiently behaving) private firms.
This raises questions common in transition economics literature. One
regards the optimal speed of reform - disorganisation resulting from disrup-
tion in the overall tax system might in principle be mitigated by a slowing
down of reforms and by maintaining some essential parts of the old revenue-
raising system. Empirical evidence from transitional economies, most notably
Russia, suggests that even though many remains of the old tax system has
actually been preserved, tax revenues have nonetheless collapsed. Casual
observations do not seem to support the virtues of gradualism in this respect.
This raises further questions. Can the choice of the tax regime be genuinely
free, or can it be driven some initial conditions (that imply that the chosen path
may have been the best feasible one)? If so, it casts doubt about the reliability
of the casual evidence cited above. One has to remember that poor perform-
ance by the tax administration may also result from corruption and rent-seek-
ing by the authorities. Uncertainty and disorganisation probably create fertile
circumstances for such behaviour to flourish.
Lopez–Claros and Alexashenko (1998) explore at a more concrete
level the challenges faced by the Russian tax authorities. They share the view
by Burgess and Stern (1993) that the move towards a more western style of
tax system, which is based on self-compliance by the tax payers and sup-
ported by random audits by the authorities, is a key measure in building a tax
system which is more capable in fighting evasion. At present, a large share of
the staff’s work in tax administration is devoted to routine tasks that in the27
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West are demanded from the tax payers themselves. The information pro-
vided by the World Bank (1995, p. 37) reveals that the tax administration is
not understaffed compared to Western countries. This suggests that there
could be quite much scope for improvements in efficiency, such as stronger
reliance on computers and education of the staff. An additional feature is the
numerous exemptions and tax incentives contained in the present tax legisla-
tion. Thus, tax exemptions not only undermine the revenue-collection capabil-
ity of the tax system, but they also exacerbate the administrative costs in-
volved. Furthermore, as the salaries within the Russian State Tax Service are
relatively low, one option to improve productivity within the tax administration
would be to consider remuneration schemes that would provide proper incen-
tives [along the lines of Hindriks et al (1998)]. Despite all the difficulties listed
above, Burgess and Stern emphasise strongly that many of the administrative
problems can be overcome with proper policy design. Therefore, their impor-
tance should not be exaggerated, and they should not be regarded as goals
that definitively override other aims in taxation (efficiency and equity). Their
discussion comes therefore close to the observation in section 3 that stressed
the threats associated with tax systems that do not take advantage of benefi-
cial complexity.
4.2 The role of the state
As mentioned above, there are some features in transitional economies that
can be regarded as more than constraints. These arise from various implica-
tions of the heritage from the socialist era, which is quite distinct to the cir-
cumstances of many of the developing countries.14 The mixed role of the
state in the economy is one important characteristic. On the one hand, eco-
nomic decisions are still very much dependent on state action and on the use
of discretionary power. This role of the state, which clearly exceeds that of a
state securing the institutional framework only, blurs the relations between
the government and the economy.15 One of the striking consequences from
this for taxation is the extremely complex structure of tax legislation and
constant changes imposed on it. On the other hand, experiences from the
Soviet era also influence public opinion on the proper role of the government.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that one of the reasons people do not pay their
taxes is the belief that the government only wastes the money instead of
producing the public goods and services they would need. Evasion can per-28
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haps be seen as a rational response to a poorly performing state. Many au-
thors, including Lopez–Claros and Alexashenko (1998), stress that success-
ful reforms require not only improving the tax system, but also reforming the
expenditure side of the budget. Moreover, it could also be given rigorous
theoretical support. If voters are highly suspicious of the government’s mo-
tives, the tax system must probably be built differently than it would be under
a more reliable government. It could be interesting to examine which kind of
safeguards this kind of ‘nihilistically fair’ tax system should employ. Intuition,
and the ideas highlighted by Brett and Keen (1997), suggest that at best it can
only be second-best: credibility requires structures that reduce pure efficiency,
e.g. earmarking of tax revenues. The fear of evasion could perhaps create
tax systems that employ tax instruments in a different way to the western
practice.16
It is also not always evident that the government pursues the role of a
welfare maximiser. Recent theoretical tax literature has examined the impli-
cations of Leviathan-type governments (those maximising tax revenue) on
tax structure. Leviathan-type behaviour can in reality be the only option for a
government seeking to balance its budget in circumstances such as those of
nowadays Russia. However, such an approach also implies that efforts to
evade taxes are also likely to rise. Another interesting case regarding Russia
could be the idea examined by Rosefielde (1998) in which the government is
very much dependent on the support from various interest groups. If one
believes that the government has these objectives, it sets new limits to norma-
tive tax theory, i.e. tax systems that are efficient in raising revenue are actu-
ally harmful to the economy. The aim for a moral person should rather be in
recommending structures that limit the power of the government. In this light,
tax evasion could have positive aspects as well, although a system Leviathan-
type government with high evasion would be welfare-inferior to a low-eva-
sion equilibrium with a benevolent state.17 Such ideas along these lines de-
serve closer examination within the context of transition economies. How-
ever, even the simple observation mentioned here supports the view that the
role of government in transition economies, and people’s response to it, com-
plicate tax analysis.
4.3 Tax policy, transition strategies and restructuring
Restructuring of old state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is one of the big chal-29
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lenges in transition. According to Blanchard (1997), the notion involves reor-
ganisation of the ownership structure and the production processes. Usually
its aim is to improve efficiency within the former SOEs. Although a bulk of
restructuring takes place within the firms, the government can influence the
process through its policies. Here, we argue that setting the level of taxation
and deciding over tax enforcement is one such measure. Government subsi-
dies to SOEs are usually associated with the notion of ‘soft budget constraint’,
but tax arrears and tax evasion may serve the same purpose. Schaffer (1995)
demonstrates that tax arrears have been much more widely used as a device
to implement soft budget constraints in many transitional economies. A cen-
tral focus within transition economy literature concerns the choice between a
fast reform strategy (‘big bang’) and a go-slow approach (gradualism). One
issue emerging from the joint analysis of tax policy and restructuring is the
possibility that firms may behave in manner inconsistent with the aims of the
government. In other words, governments may attempt to use tax policy to
accomplish restructuring objectives.
This analysis considers the role of tax arrears among the broad area of
issues concerning restructuring. We argue that tolerating tax arrears and lax
tax collection are consistent implications of a slow transition strategy. In Ap-
pendix 1, we perform a simple modelling exercise to show this. In the exam-
ple, we illustrate a situation where a firm allocates a fixed amount of re-
sources, R, to two different production processes: an old process, denoted by
o R , (which employs labour proportionally with the input, but with a cost that
is modelled with a simple convex, quadratic cost function); and a new proc-
ess,  n R , which does not (for simplicity) use labour at all. The restructuring
aspect is captured by assuming the payoff arising from the new project is
always greater than for the old project. Hence, restructuring involves shifting
the production process from type o to n. Note that a fully-efficient (first-best)
regime within this model would utilise only the process n, which yields a
larger payoff and does not incur the cost of labour. The efficient amount of
labour is therefore equal to zero. In order to make the problem of restructur-
ing non-trivial, one has to assume inefficiency in the behaviour of the firm.
The option followed here is the case of an insider-controlled firm, which max-
imises the use of labour (or the wage bill), given the feasibility constraint that
profits must be non-negative. Admittedly, this framework describes an ex-
treme case, but it is nonetheless plausible in circumstances observed in firms
that oppose restructuring. Supposing that the non-negativity constraint of the30
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profit level binds, the firm ends up employing a positive amount of labour
(depending on the costs), as opposed to the first-best level of no labour.
The government imposes lump-sum taxes on the activity of the firm.
Given the lump-sum assumption, the overall level of invested resources, R,
remains unchanged.18 The government can therefore affect post-tax profits
by varying the level of taxation. We concentrate on the most plausible case,
whereby an increase in the tax rate decreases the share of old process in the
production, i.e.  0 / < dt dRo . The intuition is that as the tax liability of the
firm increases, the feasibility constraint associated with profits is tightened
and the firm cannot hire as much labour as it would otherwise. Thus, the firm
has to be restructured by shifting towards a more efficient production proc-
ess. The government is assumed to have preferences over a fast (f) or slow
(s) transition and restructuring strategy. As the fully efficient level of labour
in the simple partial equilibrium model discussed here is zero, the reason why
the government would prefer slow restructuring implying a positive amount of
labour used must come outside of the model. Conceivably, the government
might attempt to avoid high unemployment, or be restricted by political con-
straints. In a fast reform, the efficiency benefits of the new production proc-
ess dominate, and the government sets a (high) tax to ensure that  n R  ap-
proaches the overall level of resources, R (implying that  0 ® o R ). Now con-
sider that the government for some reason begins the put a positive value on
labour used (i.e. prefers slow restructuring). This can be accomplished by
lowering the tax rate so that  o R , and thereby the use of labour, increases.
Thus, if we denote the tax levels associated with fast and slow restructuring
as  f t  and  s t , at the social optimum we have the property that  s f t t > . Note
that the government may implement the slow restructuring program either by
directly imposing a tax level equal to  s t , or it may impose a formal tax liability
of  f t , but at the same time tolerate tax evasion or permanent arrears equal to
s f t t - , implying an effective tax rate of  s t .19
The presentation of this simple example attempts to highlight the possi-
bility that tax evasion or toleration of arrears may be compatible with a slow
restructuring scenario, and therefore a rational approach in theory. The rea-
son for the slow scenario was of course fully exogenous in the set-up above.
Even in an elaborated setting, however, go-slow may prove welfare-inferior31
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to a fast approach. Governments thus end up resorting to the slow option as a
contingency e.g. attitudes among voters or unfavourable initial conditions. As
is well-known, however, many transition economists argue that a slow (gradual)
reform might actually be welfare-improving. One such suggestion, and quite
plausible within our framework here, is the one highlighted by Blanchard
(1997). He shows that if restructuring results in extremely high unemploy-
ment, the opposition of insider-owners towards restructuring increases as the
fear of unemployment increases. Roland and his co-authors [see e.g.
Dewatripont and Roland (1995)] show that under conditions of uncertainty
and irreversible investment, a slow reform can be welfare-improving through
the option value of waiting. In either case, the main point here is that restruc-
turing and tax policy are interrelated. The present situation in Russia seems
somehow consistent with this observation. Gaddy and Ickes (1998) argue
that the restructuring of Russian firms is in many cases delayed. It may be
the case that many tax exemptions and incentives included in the present tax
legislation, as well as large scale tax evasion possibilities, soften the budget
constraints for the firms and thereby open up the possibility of not restructur-
ing. In other words, while Western tax experts may regard the Russian tax
system as incomprehensible, and even irrational, the system may well reflect
an overall slow reform policy within the administration. We do not suggest
that the present tax system in Russia is efficient, only that it may be consist-
ent.
Tax policy and reform strategies may also be interrelated through deci-
sions on the overall levels of various taxes. As discussed earlier, the inherited
structure of taxation from socialism is characterised by a strong reliance on
enterprise taxation; income taxation barely existed. Moreover, the enterprise
tax system involves profit extraction or subsidies, depending on the profitabil-
ity of the SOE. Due to soft-budget constraints, many unprofitable firms ended
up refraining from restructuring and over-employed workforce. If these cir-
cumstances prevail after the collapse of socialism, it is quite plausible that a
tax system consistent with gradual reform would still rely largely on the taxa-
tion of the firm. Income taxes would be kept at a low level (perhaps because
the wage level of the population is low as unprofitable firms cannot afford
proper wages). This observation can be connected to the previous analysis in
that the policy mix would also encompass lax tax collection. In the opposite
case with a fast speed of reform, the tax system would proceed rapidly to-
wards a more western style of tax system, employing mainly income and
value-added taxes. This idea seems consistent with the empirical facts for32
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countries of the former Soviet Union (where, on the average, reform has
been relatively slow and tax systems still have many features common with
the earlier tax structures), as well as for Central European countries (where
restructuring has been fast and the tax systems are closer to Western stand-
ards). It is important to note that in many of the CEEC, the eagerness for EU-
membership might have served as a commitment to implement fast restruc-
turing and a Western style tax system. Further analysis of the relation be-
tween the tax system and the overall development of the economy and re-
form strategies would certainly be important for policy analysis in the transi-
tional countries.
5 Conclusions
Tax evasion and corruption are serious problems in many transition countries,
hampering growth and endangering the sustainability of fiscal policies. We
have surveyed theoretical literature on tax evasion and corruption to under-
stand these issues in transition economies and to provide some guidelines for
reforming such tax systems. The study also considered certain aspects of
taxation and tax evasion not often dealt with in public economics. These as-
pects seem to be transition-specific. The paper noted the following lessons
that may be useful in policy development:
• In the standard tax evasion framework, evasion can be deterred by
imposing heavy penalties or implementing a strict auditing policy. In
transition economies, strict auditing seems to be the preferred policy as
it leads to equitable treatment of tax evaders.
• Externalities among taxpayers, reputation and social norms may give
rise to the existence of multiple equilibria (low/high evasion in the
economy). Once an economy ends up in a ‘bad’ equilibrium (as some
of the transitional economies), improving the situation is difficult and
calls for a comprehensive reform of the tax system.
• High inequality and the failure of the government to provide adequate
public goods undermine public support for the tax system and increase
the incentives for tax evasion. Tax policy should therefore be consid-
ered in conjunction with expenditure policy.33
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• Optimal taxation exercises are complicated in the presence of evasion.
These results would indicate that tax evasion does not necessarily cre-
ate a need to decrease marginal tax rates. This conclusion can be in-
terpreted as a caveat against overly straightforward policies.
• Tax evasion generally seems more intractable in transitional countries
than developed countries. Thus, policies to deter evasion play a more
important role in transitional economies.
• Corruption is linked to tax evasion either directly (in the relations be-
tween taxpayers and tax officials) or indirectly (through the efficiency
and support of the public sector). Reducing corruption is often a neces-
sary condition for deterring tax evasion.
• The circumstances in the tax systems of transitional economies often
provide fertile ground for corruption. Complicated tax systems and ar-
bitrary implementation increase the demand for corruption, while low
salaries within the public sector increase the supply of corruption.
• In addition, cultural factors (such a widespread use of ‘connections’)
in some of the transitional countries explain the persistence of corrup-
tion.
• Weak administration is a major concern in tax policy in transitional
economies. Tax recommendations in the presence of weak administra-
tion lose their relevance, because complicated tax schedules cannot be
implemented. This gives rise to an efficiency-feasibility trade-off.
• The discretionary behaviour of authorities, inherited from the socialist
era, still blurs the role of the state in transitional economies. This partly
explains why tax systems in these countries remain different in com-
parison to western economies.
• Attitude towards tax evasion may depend on the country’s general
transition strategy (e.g. the speed of restructuring of production struc-
tures). Choosing a slow speed of reform may imply tolerance of tax
arrears and evasion as a way to soften the budget constraints of unpro-
ductive firms.34
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Appendix: Restructuring and tax arrears
This example illustrates the discussion in section 4 regarding the use of tax
arrears as a means of restructuring. Consider a situation where a fixed amount
of resources R may be split into the uses of  0 R  (old production line) and  n R
(new production line).  0 R  utilises labour through a function of  ) ( o R l l = ,
which for simplicity is assumed to be linear so that  o R l = . The cost of using





. Assuming the price of products from
the old line is a constant  o p , the payoff function may written as
t R
c
R p o o o - - = P
2
0 2
, where t is a lump-sum tax imposed on the produc-
tion. The payoff from the new production line is simply  t R p n n n - = P , as it
employs no labour.
The decision over R is made by insiders, who are assumed to maximise
the wage bill (or the use of labour, if the wage rate is normalised to one). The
decision is constrained by a feasibility constraint stating that profits must be
non-negative. We further assume an interior solution with the profit constraint
binding. The Lagrangian formulation of the insiders’ optimisation problem and
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(A.2) () 0 1 0 = - - + n o p cR p l .
To obtain the impact of taxation on the decision by the firm, substitute
for  o p  from the zero profit condition and differentiate (A.2) with respect to
















whose sign is ambiguous in general. The second term in the denominator
captures the impact of larger profits if production is shifted towards  n R : it is
always positive, when taxes are assumed to be smaller than the biggest possible
profit level associated with  n R R = . The first term, which depicts the cost
savings arising from the convex shape of the cost function when l decreases,
is negative. Assuming that the profit impact dominates (as in the case discussed
in the main text), (A.3) predicts that  0 <
dt
dRo . Higher taxes lead to a need to
increase profits, which can be accomplished with a higher  n R .36
Jukka Pirttilä
Institute for Economies in Transition
References
Allingham, M and A Sandmo (1972) ‘Income tax evasion: A theoretical
analysis’, Journal of Public Economics 1, 323–338.
Bardhan, B (1997) ‘Corruption and development: A review of issues’,
Journal of Economic Literature XXXV, 1320–1346.
Blanchard, O (1997) The economics of post-communist transition,
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Blanchard, O and M Kremer (1997) ‘Disorganization’, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 1091–1126.
Bliss, C (1998) ‘Causes and consequences of corruption’, Mimeo, Nuffield
College, University of Oxford.
Boadway, R and M Keen (1998) ‘Evasion and time consistency in the
taxation of capital income’, International Economic Review 39, 461–476.
Boadway, R; M Marchand and P Pestieau (1994) ‘Towards a theory of
direct-indirect tax mix’, Journal of Public Economics 55, 71–88.
Brett, C and M Keen (1997) ‘Political uncertainty and the earmarking of
environmental taxes’, Mimeo, University of Essex.
Budina, N and S van Wijnbergen (1997) ‘Fiscal policies in Eastern Eu-
rope’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 13, 47–64.
Burgess, R and N Stern (1993) ‘Taxation and development’, Journal of
Economic Literature XXXI, 762–830.
Cowell, F A (1981) ‘Taxation and labour supply with risky activities’,
Economica 48, 365–379.
Cowell, F A (1990) Cheating the government. The economics of eva-
sion. The MIT Press.
Cremer, H and F Gahvari (1993) ‘Tax evasion and optimal commodity
taxation’, Journal of Public Economics 50, 261–275.
Cremer, H and F Gahvari (1994) ‘Tax evasion, concealment and the op-
timal linear income tax’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96, 219–239.
Cremer, H and F Gahvari (1996) ‘Tax evasion and the optimum general
income tax’, Journal of Public Economics 60, 235–249.37
Tax evasion and economies in transition: lessons from tax theory
BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/1999
Dewatripont, M and G Roland (1995) ‘The design of reform packages
under uncertainty’, American Economic Review 85, 1027–1223.
Diamond, P A and J Mirrlees (1971) ‘Optimal taxation and public produc-
tion. I: Production efficiency and II: Tax rules’, American Economic Review
61, 8–27 and 261–278.
EBRD, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (1997)
‘Transition Report 1997’.
Economist Intelligence Unit (1998) Russia: Tax regulations. Mimeo,
27.9.1998
Frye, T and A Shleifer (1997) ‘The invisible hand and the grabbing hand’
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 87, 354–358.
Gaddy, C and B W Ickes (1998) To restructure or not to restructure:
informal activities and enterprise behaviour in transition. Mimeo, Pennsylva-
nia State University.
Gordon, J P F (1989) ‘Individual morality and reputation costs as deter-
rents to tax evasion’, European Economic Review 33, 797–805.
Gupta, S; H Davoodi and R Alonso-Terme (1998) ‘Does corruption af-
fect income inequality and poverty?’, IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department, Work-
ing Paper No 98/76.
Hindriks, J; M Keen and A Muthoo (1998) ‘Corruption, extortion and
evasion’. University of Essex, mimeo.
Kornai, J (1990) The road to a free economy – shifting from a socialist
system: The case of Hungary, New York: Norton.
Johnson, S; D Kaufmann and A Shleifer (1997) ‘The Unofficial economy
in transition’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 159–239.
Lopez–Claros, A and S V Alexashenko (1998) Fiscal policy issues dur-
ing the transition in Russia, IMF, Occasional Paper No 155.
Newbery, D (1997) ‘Optimal tax rates and tax design during systematic
reform’, Journal of Public Economics 63, 177–206.
Newbery, D and N Stern (Eds.) (1987) The theory of taxation for de-
veloping countries, Oxford: University Press.38
Jukka Pirttilä
Institute for Economies in Transition
Myles, G (1995) Public economics, Cambridge: University Press.
Popova, T and M Tekoniemi (1998) ‘Challenges to reforming Russia’s
tax system’, Bank of Finland, Review of Economies in Transition, 1/1998, 13–
30.
Rosefielde, S (1998) Russia’s economic cleptocracy. Mimeo, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Sandmo, A (1981) ‘Income tax evasion, labour supply, and the equity-
efficiency trade-off’, Journal of Public Economics 16, 265–288.
Schaffer, M (1995) ‘Government subsidies to enterprises in Central and
Eastern Europe: Budgetary subsidies and tax arrears’, in D M G Newbery
(ed) Tax and benefit reform in Central and Eastern Europe. London: CEPR.
Shleifer, A and R W Vishny (1993) ‘Corruption’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 108, 599–617.
Tanzi, V (1992) (Ed) ‘Fiscal policies in economies in transition’, Wash-
ington: IMF.
Tanzi, V (1993) ‘Fiscal policy and the economic restructuring of econo-
mies in transition’, IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department, Working Paper No 93/22.
Tanzi, V (1994) ‘Corruption, governmental activities, and markets’, IMF,
Fiscal Affairs Department Working Paper No 94/99.
Tanzi, V (1998) ‘Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences,
scope, and cures’ IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department, Working Paper No 98/63.
Tanzi, V and P Shome (1993) ‘A primer on tax evasion’ IMF Staff Pa-
pers 40, 807–828.
Tirole, J (1996) ‘A theory of collective reputation’, Review of Economic
Studies 63, 1–22.
World Bank (1995) Russian Federation. Towards medium term viabil-
ity. Report No 14472-RU, October 16, 1995.
Yakovlev, A (1998) ‘The Russian case of black cash tax evasion: forms,
incentives and consequences at firm-level’, Bank of Finland, Mimeo.39
Tax evasion and economies in transition: lessons from tax theory
BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/1999
Notes
* I am grateful to seminar participants at the Bank of Finland for useful comments.
Note that views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Bank of Finland.
1 3.35 on a scale of 0 (very low level of corruption) to 4 (very high).
2 Frye and Shleifer (1997) present some interesting evidence on the attitude of gov-
ernment officials towards business in Warsaw (the invisible, helping hand case) vs.
that of in Moscow (the grabbing hand case).
3 In a comment to McLure, Tait (1992) however notes that diverging strongly from
usual tax systems might endanger appropriate collection of tax revenues at a time
when the need for revenues to finance various aspects of transition is high.
4 Cowell (1990, ch. 2) discusses this issue in depth.
5 Allingham and Sandmo (1972) is a seminal contribution in this field, on which much
of the subsequent literature has built.
6 It could actually be possible to formalise the idea. Suppose for instance a situation
where the government has a choice over two forms of public goods: one (e.g. de-
fence) that benefits mostly the policy-makers or their interest groups and another
(e.g. social security) whose benefits accrue to the public. Under a repressive regime,
the state was able to use its force to implement the public good bundle it wanted to,
whereas in a decentralised system, tax payers may evade taxes more easily. It might
be possible to show that if the state opts for a public good mix favouring defence,
public goods would overall be under-provided because of wide-spread evasion. To
restore the willingness to pay taxes, the government would choose more social secu-
rity to be provided – but that would not necessarily be in the policy-makers interests.
7 The discussion here is based on Cowell (1990, Ch 7).
8 For the importance of tax evasion by firms in Russia, see Yakovlev (1998). Moreover,
labour income tax evasion can result from employees agreeing to get part of their
salary in black money.40
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9 Estonia is an interesting example of a country that has opted for simple tax rules. For
example, it has a flat labour income tax rate of 26 %. The Estonian shadow economy
is much smaller than the FSU average, yet income disparity is among the highest.
This is consistent with the probable outcomes of such tax policy.
10 Not surprisingly, there is some dispute about the definition of corruption in the
literature. Corruption may be encountered in the private sector as well; it is some-
times difficult to distinguish gifts from bribes, and corruption from rent-seeking. For
discussion on some of these matters, see Bardhan (1997).
11 The speed of restructuring in a state administration and the extent of corruption
have a theoretically interesting relationship. If restructuring of the state administra-
tion is slow in a sense that excess civil servants are not shed, the government can
only afford a low wages for its employees. This can lead to increasing willingness to
accept bribes by the civil servants.
12 Bardhan (1997) present a strikingly similar analysis to that of Johnson et al (1997).
In his model, there are three equilibria, one with very high corruption, an unstable
intermediate level, and a third with virtually no corruption. The outcome then de-
pends on the realisation of some exogenous factors, such as initial conditions.
13 These thoughts might be formalised as well. Consider a situation where govern-
ment may either use tax or non-tax revenues to collect a fixed amount of revenues.
Each form of revenue-raising is associated with its own measure of marginal cost of
public funds (MCPF) (which encompasses the collection costs as well). It would
probably be possible to illustrate that at the outset of a transitional period, the MCPF
of tax revenue exceeds that of non-tax revenues, because of a large rise in the collec-
tion costs. Eventually, of course, the MCPF measures would converge and shift
ordering, as the smaller efficiency losses from a tax (as opposed to non-tax) system
begin to dominate.
14 We touched upon the economic structure inherited from socialism earlier. This also
has its implications for the overall structure of taxation: the share of corporate taxa-
tion is still very high and that of income taxation low, even though theoretical sup-
port for such a tax system is lacking.41
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15 Shleifer (1997) provides some interesting evidence from such behaviour among the
Russian authorities.
16 As Tait (1992) points out, relying on the taxation of firms could be explained by the
need to obtain resources from a large set of taxes (so that tax collection has more
scope). Another illustration might concern some tax forms that imply losses in effi-
ciency and equity (such as uniform indirect tax system in circumstances where redis-
tribution through the income tax system is weak – see Burgess and Stern (1993)), but
can be sustained by arguments referring to the need to fight evasion.
17 A similar line of argument is applied by Boadway and Keen (1998), who show that
enforcing only lax tax collection may serve as second-best way for the government to
overcome time inconsistency problems in capital income taxation.
18 A more realistic set-up would encompass distortionary taxation (e.g. in a sense that
0 ) ( < ¢ t R ), but it seems that this extension does not affect the composition of
investment.
19 In the case where taxation creates distortions, there would be a trade-off in the
decision over the tax rate. For a given R, a higher tax rate leads to faster restructuring,
but if the higher tax rate discourages the aggregate level of investment in the economy
in a sense that R falls, increasing taxation imposes a cost as well.42
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